The Fragile Fabric of Union; Cotton, Federal Politics, and t
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The Fragile Fabric of Union; Cotton, Federal Politics, and t
Brian Schoen. The Fragile Fabric of Union; Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009. 369 pages. $55.00 (hardcover).
The Fragile Fabric of Union examines the regional and global economic factors that eventually led to the Civil War. Brian Schoen makes a compelling argument that economic considerations driven by the global demand for cotton cloth were the primary factors separating the agrarian Deep South and the mercantile and manufacturing interests of the Northeast. Slavery was a factor in the debate, but initially not the central factor.
Eli Whitney’s dramatic improvement of the cotton gin enabled the rapid processing of cotton on a commercial scale. This in turn helped to rescue the shattered economy of the Deep South, destroyed by the ravages of the Revolutionary War. In addition to reviving the moribund agricultural economy of Georgia and the Carolinas, the advent of “King Cotton” also breathed new life into the “peculiar institution”. It had been widely supposed that slavery would die a slow natural death as market forces and international approbation gradually took their toll. The perceived requirements for a cheap captive work force to meet the accelerating demands of British textile mills put an end to that illusory hope, and sowed the seeds of future disaster.
Schoen describes how the advent of the Napoleonic Wars and the resultant coercive British and French trade restrictions produced the Jeffersonian economic embargo in reply. This was an economic disaster for Southern agriculture and Northern shipping alike. Through most of the embargo years the South remained steadfast in their support of this policy which emphasized shared sacrifice and economic warfare in place of the real thing. The author emphasizes the undue trust the planters placed in the affects that an artificial cotton shortage would have on the British economy. They were confident that the British would eventually buckle under the weight of massive unemployment and declining profits, which never reached the level of pain necessary to bring parliament into line. This same assumption was to help ruin the Southern economy during the Civil War, inadvertently hastening its end.
The mercantile and shipping interests of the Northeast were always reluctant partners in this quasi-war, and became more averse as fortunes were lost and ships rotted at their moorings. National economic distress eventually led enough Southern defections to join with John Quincy Adams and his northern political allies to help kill the embargo. This did nothing to alleviate the ongoing problems with Great Britain, which continued to restrict trade and impress sailors, resulting in the War of 1812.
After the war, sectional rivalries were fueled by Northern attempts to encourage its’ nascent manufacturing sector by the imposition of tariffs on finished goods. Southern planters vehemently opposed tariffs and promoted free trade for sectional economic considerations. They felt it unfair to penalize many planters by increasing the cost of imported goods in order to help the bottom line of a few Northern industrialists. They also believed that the imposition of high tariffs would lead Great Britain to retaliate by encouraging cotton cultivation within their ever growing satellite empire.
The author demonstrates that although slavery was always a subtext within the great tariff debates, it was economic considerations that were the driving force. The lines of this debate were not always clearly drawn. Famed senator, orator, and perennial Massachusetts presidential contender Daniel Webster became a Southern hero with an eloquent defense of free trade. He faced Southern vituperation and perhaps cost himself the presidency only a few years later with, in today’s terms, a major flip-flop on the issue.
The first great nullification crisis was a precursor of things to come. South Carolina led the effort to declare states rights paramount over national suzerainty, but eventually backed away from the brink. Although the abolitionist movement was beginning to make itself heard, the nullification conflict was primarily concerned with the economic issue of protectionism versus free trade and not with the eradication of slavery.
Brian Schoen illustrates that disputes over the expansion of slavery into new territories and states were driven by southern economic and political considerations. The Cotton South felt economically threatened by the North and looked to expand their influence in Congress by increasing the number of cotton growing slave states. The Missouri Compromise and the ill-fated Kansas-Nebraska Act were both attempts to bridge the ever growing chasm between these interests and the moral arguments arrayed against them. Schoen writes that, “The debate over slavery’s expansion, along with concerns over its political and economic security in the Union, propelled the Cotton States to secession.”
The books final section, An Unnatural Union describes how almost every national issue had become sectionalized in the final years leading up to the Civil War. Trade, tariffs, internal improvements, homesteading, territorial expansion, international relations, even the route of the transcontinental railroad were all seen through the prism of perceived regional advantage in an implacable economic rivalry. Driven by fears of economic ruin and slave rebellion, an exaggerated sense of personal honor, and a mistaken belief in the subservience of the British economy to King Cotton, southern firebrands resolved upon the path of succession if Abraham Lincoln was elected. The phenomenal growth of the cotton economy had once been viewed as a means of tightening the bonds of union through trade, shipping, and prosperity. Instead, Schoen concludes, “…without cotton and the international demand for it, there would not have been a succession or a civil war.
Students of the causes of the Civil war should read The Fragile Fabric of Union. It is well written and extensively documented. The book’s relatively narrow focus enables it to avoid the pitfalls of many survey histories, which often read like textbooks. The author brings the issues to life by illustrating how economic self interest colored the views of the South to the point that they were willing to sunder the Union and go to War. Like many a good history, it illuminates the motivations and actions of past participants as seen through their eyes. Whether we learn from it is another story.
Stephen Donnelly is a consultant for the insurance industry.
The Fragile Fabric of Union examines the regional and global economic factors that eventually led to the Civil War. Brian Schoen makes a compelling argument that economic considerations driven by the global demand for cotton cloth were the primary factors separating the agrarian Deep South and the mercantile and manufacturing interests of the Northeast. Slavery was a factor in the debate, but initially not the central factor.
Eli Whitney’s dramatic improvement of the cotton gin enabled the rapid processing of cotton on a commercial scale. This in turn helped to rescue the shattered economy of the Deep South, destroyed by the ravages of the Revolutionary War. In addition to reviving the moribund agricultural economy of Georgia and the Carolinas, the advent of “King Cotton” also breathed new life into the “peculiar institution”. It had been widely supposed that slavery would die a slow natural death as market forces and international approbation gradually took their toll. The perceived requirements for a cheap captive work force to meet the accelerating demands of British textile mills put an end to that illusory hope, and sowed the seeds of future disaster.
Schoen describes how the advent of the Napoleonic Wars and the resultant coercive British and French trade restrictions produced the Jeffersonian economic embargo in reply. This was an economic disaster for Southern agriculture and Northern shipping alike. Through most of the embargo years the South remained steadfast in their support of this policy which emphasized shared sacrifice and economic warfare in place of the real thing. The author emphasizes the undue trust the planters placed in the affects that an artificial cotton shortage would have on the British economy. They were confident that the British would eventually buckle under the weight of massive unemployment and declining profits, which never reached the level of pain necessary to bring parliament into line. This same assumption was to help ruin the Southern economy during the Civil War, inadvertently hastening its end.
The mercantile and shipping interests of the Northeast were always reluctant partners in this quasi-war, and became more averse as fortunes were lost and ships rotted at their moorings. National economic distress eventually led enough Southern defections to join with John Quincy Adams and his northern political allies to help kill the embargo. This did nothing to alleviate the ongoing problems with Great Britain, which continued to restrict trade and impress sailors, resulting in the War of 1812.
After the war, sectional rivalries were fueled by Northern attempts to encourage its’ nascent manufacturing sector by the imposition of tariffs on finished goods. Southern planters vehemently opposed tariffs and promoted free trade for sectional economic considerations. They felt it unfair to penalize many planters by increasing the cost of imported goods in order to help the bottom line of a few Northern industrialists. They also believed that the imposition of high tariffs would lead Great Britain to retaliate by encouraging cotton cultivation within their ever growing satellite empire.
The author demonstrates that although slavery was always a subtext within the great tariff debates, it was economic considerations that were the driving force. The lines of this debate were not always clearly drawn. Famed senator, orator, and perennial Massachusetts presidential contender Daniel Webster became a Southern hero with an eloquent defense of free trade. He faced Southern vituperation and perhaps cost himself the presidency only a few years later with, in today’s terms, a major flip-flop on the issue.
The first great nullification crisis was a precursor of things to come. South Carolina led the effort to declare states rights paramount over national suzerainty, but eventually backed away from the brink. Although the abolitionist movement was beginning to make itself heard, the nullification conflict was primarily concerned with the economic issue of protectionism versus free trade and not with the eradication of slavery.
Brian Schoen illustrates that disputes over the expansion of slavery into new territories and states were driven by southern economic and political considerations. The Cotton South felt economically threatened by the North and looked to expand their influence in Congress by increasing the number of cotton growing slave states. The Missouri Compromise and the ill-fated Kansas-Nebraska Act were both attempts to bridge the ever growing chasm between these interests and the moral arguments arrayed against them. Schoen writes that, “The debate over slavery’s expansion, along with concerns over its political and economic security in the Union, propelled the Cotton States to secession.”
The books final section, An Unnatural Union describes how almost every national issue had become sectionalized in the final years leading up to the Civil War. Trade, tariffs, internal improvements, homesteading, territorial expansion, international relations, even the route of the transcontinental railroad were all seen through the prism of perceived regional advantage in an implacable economic rivalry. Driven by fears of economic ruin and slave rebellion, an exaggerated sense of personal honor, and a mistaken belief in the subservience of the British economy to King Cotton, southern firebrands resolved upon the path of succession if Abraham Lincoln was elected. The phenomenal growth of the cotton economy had once been viewed as a means of tightening the bonds of union through trade, shipping, and prosperity. Instead, Schoen concludes, “…without cotton and the international demand for it, there would not have been a succession or a civil war.
Students of the causes of the Civil war should read The Fragile Fabric of Union. It is well written and extensively documented. The book’s relatively narrow focus enables it to avoid the pitfalls of many survey histories, which often read like textbooks. The author brings the issues to life by illustrating how economic self interest colored the views of the South to the point that they were willing to sunder the Union and go to War. Like many a good history, it illuminates the motivations and actions of past participants as seen through their eyes. Whether we learn from it is another story.
Stephen Donnelly is a consultant for the insurance industry.
